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Resumo Num mundo onde as pessoas têm de se submeter a um alto escrutínio em
cada processo que iniciam, e num mundo onde o ambiente digital cresce in-
cessantemente, antecipa-se que cada vez mais serviços on-line peçam atrib-
utos pessoais e necessitem de confiar em tais atributos. Para lidar com
essa necessidade, descrevemos uma proposta para um repositório seguro,
descentralizado e compartilhado de atributos pessoais certificados. Os uti-
lizadores beneficiam pois, têm controlo total sobre a divulgação de seu con-
junto de atributos certificados (e.g., para comprovar a sua identidade junto
dos fornecedores de serviços). As entidades certificadoras beneficiam de uma
infraestrutura descentralizada persistente baseada em blockchain, evitando
custos mais altos de uma infraestrutura centralizada sempre ativa, mantendo
o poder de emitir e revogar atributos certificados. Finalmente, os fornece-
dores de serviços beneficiam da exatidão e dos atributos certificados que os
indivíduos lhes revelam.

Abstract In a world where people must subject themselves to high scrutiny in every
process they initiate, and in a world where the digital environment grows in-
cessantly, we anticipate more on-line services asking for personal attributes
and their need to trust in such attributes. For tackling such need, we de-
scribe a proposal for a secure, decentralized and shared repository of certified
personal attributes. Individuals benefit because they have full control over
the disclosure of their set of certified attributes (e.g., to assert their identities
to service providers). The certifying entities benefit from a resilient, decen-
tralized infrastructure, avoiding the higher costs of an always-on centralized
infrastructure, while retaining the power to issue and revoke certified at-
tributes. Finally service providers benefit from the correctness and freshness
of the certified attributes that individuals disclosed to them.

Contents
Contents i
List of Figures v
List of Tables vii
List of Acronyms ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation and Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Digital Identity 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authorisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Attribute Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Self-Sovereign Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Identity Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1 OAuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 OpenID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.3 SAML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Digital Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.2 Certification Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.3 Attribute Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.4 Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.5 Web Of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Blockchain 13
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 Digital Wallets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
i
3.3 Hierarchical Deterministic wallets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.5 Consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.5.1 Proof of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.5.2 Proof of Stake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Delegated Proof of Stake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.5.3 Proof of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.5.4 Byzantine Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Federated Byzantine Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.6 Smart Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.7 Types of Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.7.1 Public Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7.2 Private Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7.3 Permissioned Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 State of the art 21
4.1 Sovrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 uPort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 Blockcerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4 ShoCard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Solution architecture 27
5.1 Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2 Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3 Interactions Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3.1 Attribute certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3.2 Exploitation of certified attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3.3 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.4 Trust Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.5 User Wallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6 Implementation 33
6.1 Choice of Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2 Hyperledger Fabric and Hyperledger Composer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2.1 Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2.2 Consensus Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.3 Modeling of network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.3.1 Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.3.2 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.3.3 Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.4 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.5 Integration Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.6 Testing and Demo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.6.1 Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.6.2 Demo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
ii
7 Result Analysis 47
8 Conclusion 49
8.1 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Bibliography 51
iii
iv
List of Figures
1.1 Peter Steiner Cartoon about anonymity on the internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.1 Example of an attribute set composing an identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Public Key Infrastructure Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Block sequence on a blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Bitcoin Transaction flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 Double Spending Problem and Application of Consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.5 The Byzantine Generals Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6 Smart Contract managing resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 An overview of sovrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 An overview of uPort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3 An overview of blockcerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4 An overview of shoCard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1 Example of a set of attributes as a tagged value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Simplified flow chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.3 Proposed trust model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1 Graph to answer: Do you need a blockchain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2 Hyperledger architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.3 Hyperledger Consensus Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.4 Participants properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.5 Example of a transaction processor function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.6 Example of Access Control Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.7 Integration with other services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.8 Composer playground: entities used in testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.9 Composer playground: Attribute Provider view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.10 Composer playground: Asset Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.11 User App Grant Access action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.12 Composer playground: Failed transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.13 User App listing Service Providers with access to an attribute . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.1 Error upon trying to access an attribute that does not belong to the current user 47
7.2 Card files to authenticate participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
v
vi
List of Tables
3.1 Summary of blockchain technologies categorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1 Summary definition and examples of resources on Hyperledger . . . . . . . . . . 37
vii
viii
List of Acronyms
AA Attribute Authority
ACL Access Control Language
AP Attribute Provider
BFT Byzantine Fault Tolerance
BIP Bitcoin Improvement Proposal
CA Certification Authority
CLI Command Line Interface
Dapp Decentralised Application
DBFT Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance
DID Decentralised Identifier
DPoS Delegated Proof of Stake
DLT Distributed Ledger Technology
FBFT Federated Byzantine Fault Tolerance
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
ID Identifier
IdP Identity Provider
IdM Identity Management
IoT Internet of Things
IPFS Interplanetary File System
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
MSP Membership Service Provider
PBFT Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
PIN Personal Identification Number
ix
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PoA Proof of Authority
PoS Proof of Stake
PoW Proof of Work
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RA Registration Authority
RB Regulatory Body
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SP Service Provider
SSO Single Sign-On
VA Validation Authority
XML Extensible Markup Language
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1993, Peter Steiner published a cartoon on the New York Times making a parable about
anonymity on the internet [1]: “On the internet, nobody knows you’re a dog”.
Figure 1.1: Peter Steiner Cartoon about anonymity on the internet.
Twenty five years later, these words, presented on that comic, still, illustrate the challenge
to identify individuals on-line.
Identity is a concept unique to the human being and it should not be confused with
documents containing the owners Identifier (ID) (e.g., passport).
With the growing dependency from information technology, the concept of digital identity
arouse and was linked to the identity register stored in databases [2]. Digital identity can be
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defined by a set of attributes associated with the subject to whom the identity relates [3],
which can themselves be defined as a piece of property or data about the person that can be
attested by a trusted party [4].
As technology became a daily aspect of our lives, unconsciously, we started to create several
partial identities for each service we may need, linked to an ID (e.g., an email address). This
ID serves as an aggregator for a sub-set of attributes related to the respective service, and is
generally protected by a password. And soon enough we started to see that a breach in one
of these services would reveal personal attributes. In 2014, Sony Pictures was targeted by a
group of hackers that leaked confidential data; on this leak there was also personal information
of employees and their families, and salary information [5]. This example illustrates the risks
of leaks of attributes managed by third parties.
Breaches like the one mentioned, could possibly lead to a snowball effect, were an attacker
would be able to access other services sharing the same credentials. With events like this, we
had to learn to segregate credentials to mitigate appearances in “pwned” lists. Unfortunately,
humans are bad at remembering several different credentials, so cross-platform Identity Man-
agement (IdM) were deployed to help them. As Google, Facebook and other organizations,
have accounts from a large number of users, they start providing an authentication service
that attests the user identity to services from other companies, simplifying the user authenti-
cation by avoiding the need for the user to register in all those other services and to manage
passwords for them all. We now have Identity Provider (IdP) that in exchange for that new
authentication service they provide to relying services, gather more user attributes provided
by those services, which is a relevant threat to the users’ privacy.
Centralized models of IdM currently face challenges with the increase of data breaches
that, ultimately, can lead to user privacy losses. This type of phenomena highlights the lack
of control and ownership that end-users experiences with their digital identity. A decentralized
service may fill some of the flaws present in a centralized service, in a decentralized scenario the
identity information is referenced in a ledger that no single central authority owns or control.
Fortunately, Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), is today a mature decentralized solution
with several possible uses; one of them is identity management and user control of its identity
[6]. The scenario where the user is in complete control of their identity, how it is stored, how
and to whom it is revealed, is now possible, and has recently begun to be associated with the
term: self-sovereign identity.
The work presented in this document will be focused on introducing self-sovereign identity
applied to personal attributes.
1.1 Motivation and Problem
When using Google or Facebook as a way to login in other relying services, a user, in-
evitably, agrees to share with these services some information about themselves, i.e., attributes
from their identity. Some services only need these attributes and rely on the IdP as a mean to
guarantee that those attributes are somewhat true. Sync.me1 is a prime example of a service
that uses Google or Facebook to gather information about the user, the goal of the service is
to build a global phone book, for this, it uses the list of contacts that the user saves in the
aforementioned providers. The type of interaction mentioned above can be summarized in
1https://sync.me/
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two aspects, a party has interest in accessing an attribute and the user has interest in sharing
that attribute.
This can be particularly interesting with attributes that need to be certified by a trusted
entity, such as an academic certificate. This document serves as a proof of a competence
acquired by the subject, i.e., it is an attribute of the subject. In a traditional scenario, the
subject would have a printed copy with an official stamp and hand-written signature that can
be presented to interested parties. In alternative, a copy can be made but would have to be
signed by a notary to prove its origin.
Even though organizations tend to provide attributes digitally, through a proprietary plat-
form or other means, in many cases an attribute will still be linked to a physical document.
With the amount of web services available to us nowadays, it is very easy to encounter
limitations because a service may need to verify an attribute presented in a physical document.
This led to the research presented in this paper and to the formulation of the following problem:
How can we certify attributes in a connected world without prejudice to the subjects’ privacy
and giving them control over their personal attributes.
1.2 Contribution
This dissertation describes a solution to give an individual complete control over disclosure
of a specific set of their identity attributes, those that are certified by a trusted third party.
For this we must distance ourself from centralized entities that own attributes that belong to
users, and move towards the edge were the user stands.
Having in mind the removal of control from a central entity, we are looking at a decentral-
ized solution. As this is the core feature of Blockchain, and as DLTs main goal is to provide
decentralized trustless networks, it can be conveniently mapped to fit our goals.
Thus we propose a system to manage attributes while conforming with self-sovereign iden-
tity. In addition it must also comply with the following requirements:
• Data Security: Identities and their respective attributes must be stored in a secure
fashion, possibly protected by cryptographic functions;
• Issuer Validation: An issuer must only be able to certify attributes under its jurisdic-
tion;
• Unlinkability: Knowing one or more attributes from a user must not give the oppor-
tunity to know all the remaining attributes from that user. Entities with access to an
user attribute must not know which other entities can access it and for what purposes;
• Revocation: Attributes must be revocable by the respective issuer entity;
• Repudiation: It must be possible for users to repudiate attributes issued on their
behalf;
• Usability: To interact with the system, the necessity to understand the underlying
technologies, such as blockchain, key management procedures or encryption protocols,
should not exist.
During the research process, from which this dissertation resulted, a project proposal
was submitted, in December 2017, to Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda under the Prémio
Inovação INCM 2017 grant. Unfortunately the project was not selected.
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The research also led to the publication of a paper entitled “A propose for a federated
ledger for regulated self-sovereignty” in CISTI’2018 - 13th Iberian Conference on Information
Systems and Technologies [7]. The paper aimed to present the idea of a regulated ledger
for self-sovereignty and discuss some of the necessary requirements and possible technology
solutions to solve them.
As a result of the publication in the CISTI’18 proceedings, we were invited to publish in
the Journal of Information Systems Engineering & Management, the opportunity was taken
to update the idea with the work developed since then. The article, entitle: “Federation of
Attribute Providers for User Self-Sovereign Identity”, is currently submitted for review.
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Chapter 2
Digital Identity
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Definitions
A digital identity is a representation of an identity that takes part in an on-line transaction.
It is unique and usually confined to a service or context. This does not mean that the real life
identity must be known, as this uniqueness does not have to be transversal between contexts
[8].
There are several components linked to the digital identity concept, and to better under-
stand the platforms that deal with digital identity we need define some of the core concepts.
Identifier
An identifier can be seen as the answer to the question “Who are you”. It is used to
distinguish different entities in a system. A entity can have different identifiers, this can be
dictated by the function or context. Examples of identifiers are: the name, Citizen Card
number, Social Security number, student number, among many others. Depending on the
needs of the specific service an user may want to obtain, different identifiers may be used [9].
Authentication
Authentication of an entity occurs when proof of correlation between user and identity is
provided. Generally the system provides a challenge on which the user can apply a trans-
formation based on some secret or private information (token) or provide the system with a
secret, the token and secret are known as authenticator. In the later, authenticators can be
passwords, Personal Identification Number (PIN) or private keys. For passwords and PINs
the system will perform a comparison with stored values in its possession. With private keys
the process is different, as no secret (private key) is transmitted and the system uses the user
public key to verify a proof (the result of a transformation) that the user is in possession of
the corresponding private key.
The classic paradigm for authentication identifies three factors as cornerstones [8]:
1. Something you know (e.g., a password)
2. Something you have (e.g., an ID badge or cryptographic key)
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3. Something you are (e.g., biometric data)
The combination of more than one of these factors leads to Multi-factor authentication
Authorisation
Authorisation is the function of defining rights or privileges to something or someone to
access some resource or perform some action. Access control can then evaluate if the rights
given are sufficient in order to access the intended resources [10].
Attribute
Attributes are pieces of data that form an identity. These values can be persistent,
ephemeral or mutable (i.e. their value may vary over time). As examples of attribute we
can consider age, employer or address.
Figure 2.1: Drivers License composed by several personal attributes
Figure 2.1 shows a drivers license (representing the user identity) composed by the the
attributes described by the values in the respective field.
Attribute Attestation
Attestations or claims are assertions that maps a certain attribute to an identity. In some
identity management systems, attribute verification follows a successful authentication, this
confirms that the identity presented is the correct one. An attribute attestation can be a bank
attesting to a certain individual having a determined bank account with a certain number.
Federation
A Federation is a collection of domains that establish trust and that facilitates authen-
tication and subscriber attribute verification across networked systems. In a federation the
verifier is referred as an IdP [11].
2.1.2 Self-Sovereign Identity
Self-Sovereign identity is a user centric approach to identity. It mandates that the indi-
vidual should have full control and autonomy over their identity and data.
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The cryptographer Christopher Allen defines ten principles for self-sovereign identity1:
1. Existence: Users must be independent from the system. An identity, particularly a
self-sovereign one, is based on the “I” and can never be completely digital, so in the
context of self-sovereign identity only some limited aspects of the “I” are made public
and accessible.
2. Control: Users must control their identities. The users are the maximum authority on
their identity. They decide how and to whom their identity is disclosed and used. They
should always be able to refer to it, update it or hide it. This does not mean a user
controls all claims on their identity, other entities can make claims about a user.
3. Access: Users must have access to their own data. Users own identity should always
be readably available to them. Without meaning that they can freely alter their claim,
but it means they should always be aware of them.
4. Transparency: Systems and algorithms must be transparent. The processes and system
used to manage data, and the algorithms used to analyse it must be well-known, open-
source and preferably independent of any particular architecture.
5. Persistence: Identities must be long-lived. Identity should last for ever or as long as
the user desires. This must not contradict the “right to be forgotten”.
6. Portability: Information and services about identity must be transportable. Identities
should not be owned by third parties, even if trusted. Allowing an identity to be trans-
portable means that users remains in control of their identity even in a change of regime
or jurisdiction.
7. Interoperability: Identities should be as widely usable as possible. Identities must
operate across systems, companies and borders. Their value diminishes when their
range of usage is limited to niches.
8. Consent: Users must agree to the use of their identity. Sharing of data must occur
only with the consent of the owner of said data. Even if a party offers a claim about a
user, the user must consent to its validity, this does not have the need to be interactive
but should still be deliberate.
9. Minimalization: Disclosure of claims must be minimized. When data is disclosed, this
discloser should involve the minimal amount of data possible. As an example, if only a
minimum age is asked, then the exact age should not be disclosed, and if only an age is
requested, then the more precise date of birth should not be disclosed.
10. Protection: The rights of users must be protected. When a conflict between the needs
of the system and the rights of the user arises, the system should fail in order to preserver
the rights of the users.
These may seem very strict principles, but all are required in a truly self-sovereign system.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)2, introduced in Europe this year legislates
some of this principles and increases the importance of research in this context.
1https://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2016/04/the-path-to-self-soverereign-identity.html
2https://www.eugdpr.org/
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2.2 Identity Management Systems
The enterprise environment brew the need to unify authentication and/or authorization
systems in order to achieve easier management and better security. This need would rapidly
evolve to full fledge systems capable of dealing with the problem of fragmented multi-account,
referred in the first chapter, by centralizing the user identity data and standardizing its usage.
Some approaches are summarised bellow.
2.2.1 OAuth
OAuth [12, 13] is an open standard for authorization. OAuth enables an application, the
client, to take action and access resources on a resource server on behalf of the user, without
the need to share credentials with the client.
The goals of OAuth are achieved by allowing the issuing of tokens by an IdP to the third
party applications. This token is then used by the client to access said resources.
Although OAuth is dedicated to authorization, it can be used as a form of pseudo-
authentication. This pseudo-authentication relies on a twist of the authorization process.
The service will suppose that if the token provided by the user accesses resources from the
user, then it means that the user is indeed who he claims.
2.2.2 OpenID
OpenID is an open standard for authentication3. With OpenID an user must choose and
obtain an OpenID account through an IdP supporting the standard. The user shall then use
this account to login in into third party services.
OpenID Connect
The current version of OpenID is OpenID Connect4. This is an identity layer built on top
of OAuth 2.0, allowing clients to verify the identity of the user based on the authentication
performed by the authorization server. On top of this, it also allows the client to access several
basic information about the user using REST-like services. There are proprietary standards
that operate in a similar fashion, e.g., Facebook Login5.
2.2.3 SAML
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is a framework based in Extensible Markup
Language (XML) for communicating user authentication, entitlement, and attribute informa-
tion6.
SAML enables web Single Sign-On (SSO) through the communication of an assertion from
one service to another. This second service, if confident of the origin of the assertion, can then
accept the user authentication as if it was done directly.
An other interesting use case of SAML is attribute-based authorization. Where a party
informs other party on access attributes that the user possesses. In this case, this information
3https://openid.net/
4https://openid.net/connect/
5https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/
6http://saml.xml.org/
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can be limited to some attributes of their identity instead of the whole set, or as supplement,
how and when this user was authenticated.
2.3 Public Key Infrastructure
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [14, 15] has the intent to manage public key encryption
and certificates. It also facilitates authentication of parties in a network and secure transfer
of information. It is composed by set of roles, policies and procedures to create, manage, use,
store, and revoke digital certificates.
A PKI binds entities with their respective public key. The binding is established through
the registration of the entities, by a Registration Authority (RA), followed by the issuance
of certificates by a Certification Authority (CA). This process may depend on the level of
security required. Different levels of security may apply to this process depending on the
requirements.
In public key cryptography, each entity owns a key pair, composed by a public and private
key. These two keys have a relation such that data encrypted with one key can only be
decrypted with the other key. The public key of an entity is well known and widely distributed,
while the private key must be kept secret and safe by the owner. This private key can be used to
authenticate the user, i.e., to prove that they are the owner of a public key in a certificate and,
consequently, that they are the owner of the identity attributes contained in the certificate,
typically a name.
Figure 2.2: Public Key Infrastructure Diagram. A user applies for a certificate with his public
key at a RA. The latter confirms the identity of the user to the CA which in turn issues
the certificate. The user can then digitally sign data using his new certificate. His identity is
then checked by the interested party with a VA which again receives information about issued
certificates by the CA8.
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2.3.1 Digital Certificates
Strong public key, as read only objects, provide some protection against forged keys.
However, an evil doer could pass as the secure directory containing this key, allowing him,
instead of the intended recipient, to decrypt messages. Thus, we need a way to validate public
keys. Digital certificates provide key validation.
A certificate is a digital document that binds a public key to an entity (a person, applica-
tion, service, etc.). These certificates contain information about the issuing entity, the subject
of the certificate, expiration date and a digital signature. This signature ensures that the
issuing entity is verified [16].
2.3.2 Certification Authorities
A Certification Authority (CA) issues certificates, which are signed documents containing
a public key linked to some identity attributes (typically, the name) from a given entity. For
this, it needs to act as a trust anchor for both the subject entity of the certificate, the certificate
owner, and the entities relying on it.
In other words, a CA is a centralized entity that provides individual validation for every
entity that wishes to be certified.
It was already establish that an entity is verified by a CA, this CA can also be verified by
other CA, and so on until it reaches a root Authority. This is a particular type of CA that is
inherently trusted by the user and/or system.
2.3.3 Attribute Authorities
An Attribute Authority (AA) [17] works in a similar fashion to a Certificate Authority.
When there is the need to separate public keys and attributes, an AA can be used to publish
an attribute certificate.
The use of Attribute Certificates may be useful when the related public key certificate
life-time possesses a different life-time from the one of the attribute, or vice versa. It is also
useful when a CA does not have authority over an attribute.
2.3.4 Signatures
Digital signature act as proof of authenticity and integrity of a piece of data. It guarantees
that digital signed information was produces by a trusted source and that its content remained
the same since the signature.
Data goes through an hashing functions that produces an output uneasy to reverse en-
gineer. This hash is then encrypted with the private key of the entity and sent with the
data. The receiver can validate the message integrity by using the same hashing functions
and matching it with the decrypted signature.
2.3.5 Web Of Trust
With the introduction of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 2.0 it was also introduced the concept
of web of trust. Web of trust refers to a decentralised model of key validation achieved via peer
validation of public keys. The process occurs when a user identifies public keys as belonging
8Image source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_infrastructure
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to a certain individual, a chain of trust can then be followed until a trusted user is reached
[18].
The difference between a typical PKI and PGP resides that in the former the certificate
is issued by a CA, which are organized in a hierarchical structure, and in the later any entity
can issue a certificate. When validating, in the hierarchical model trusting the root is enough
to validate any certificate, however, in the distributed model, the validation implies that we
trust the entity that issued it.
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Chapter 3
Blockchain
3.1 Introduction
A blockchain is a continuous growing list, or ledger, of records. In this type of ledger
the records are called blocks and are linked and secured with cryptographic functions. This
linkage is implemented by including in each block a cryptographic hash of the previous block,
blocks include a timestamp and a list of transactions processed.
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto [19] introduced a blockchain as the cryptocurrency Bitcoin.
Bitcoin was the first digital currency to address and solve the problem of double spending
without the need of a centralized party.
Figure 3.1: Block sequence on a blockchain1.
The design of a blockchain offers, the data in it, a natural immutability and persistence.
Such immutability is achieved due to each block containing the hash of the previous block,
any alteration to a block would alter the hash, this would imply a change in all subsequent
blocks in order to keep the chain valid, and this is extremely hard, or impossible, because
of the consensus mechanism employed. Once added, a piece of data cannot be retroactively
altered. This properties makes this type of ledger a desirable mean to maintain a permanent
and verifiable record of transactions between parties.
A blockchain will run in a peer-to-peer fashion where each node of the network contains
an integral copy of the ledger. This requires that all the nodes agree to the information being
stored and that all of them have the truest and most recent chain to consult or work on. The
need for a consensus between all the nodes can be resolved with many different decentralized
consensus strategies.
1Image source: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Blockchain
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3.2 Digital Wallets
In networks dedicated to cryptocurrency a digital wallet exists to hold the currency. A
party that owns such a wallet has a set of public and private keys. The wallet is used to store
the set of asymmetrical keys used in operations related to the ledger.
A digital wallet is sometimes referred as the coins address, where this address is one of the
public keys in the wallet that is used to identify the receiver of a transaction, the private key
of the pair is used to authorize transactions and prove ownership.
In summary, the public key is an alias of identity on the network as it cannot be directly
linked to the individual that owns it.
3.3 Hierarchical Deterministic wallets
A deterministic wallet is a simple method of generating an address from a seed, which
the User owns and controls. Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) 00322 describes a type of
deterministic wallet that can generate a near infinite number child keys from the seed key.
The child can operate independently from the parent and the parent will continue to be
able to operate even if the child key is compromised, as the relation bottom-up is invisible.
Figure 3.2: Hierarchical Deterministic wallets: given a seed key and a index, a cryptographic
function derives several child keys4.
2https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki
4Image source: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki
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Given that the public key is an alias of identity of the user, this mechanism facilitates the
management of multiple keys from the same user, this can be interesting in a scenario where
we have interest in improving an user privacy.
3.4 Transactions
A transaction represents a transfer of tokens, where a token is some asset, like currency in
Bitcoin. In Bitcoin, transactions must include an identification of the recipient (a public key),
and must be signed (using a private key) by the sender. These transactions will then be put
in a block that must be inserted into the ledger. The process related to block insertion in the
ledger is related to consensus mechanism that will be address in the next section.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the flow of a transaction in the Bitcoin network. Alice intends to
send Bob some digital currency, for this Bob has to give his wallet address to Alice, only then
can she create a new transaction. This transaction contains the address from Bob account, the
amount of coin, and the fee needed to finance the consensus. Alice will sign the transaction
with her private key, this will give the network a cryptographic proof that Alice owns the
origin address and can operate those coins. After this step the transaction is propagated
through the network, where it is received by other machines, known as miners, that will lend
their computing power to build the blocks.
Figure 3.3: A transaction flow through the Bitcoin network5.
3.5 Consensus
Using a blockchain to replace a traditional centralized ledger with a distributed one creates
the need to ensure that all the transactions are correctly ordered and synchronised.
5Image source: https://halpernfinancial.com/views/what-is-blockchain-and-why-should-i-care
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Given that any party can submit new information to the blockchain, it is necessary for the
nodes to evaluate and agree on this information before it can be permanently added to the
chain.
In the Bitcoin network, where we deal with a currency, the new information may be related
with payment of services, the new addition of data will also imply a verification to validate if
there is enough currency to perform the transaction. Alice sends a transaction with a certain
amount of currency to Bob, the network needs to ensure that Alice owns that amount of coin
and that is not being spent twice. An evil doer may try to submit the same coin in very close
instant of time, this is called double spending, and represents a problem intended to be solved
by consensus algorithms [20].
Figure 3.4 illustrates this problem and how the application of a consensus algorithm may
help counter it.
Figure 3.4: The Double spending problem on Bitcoin is solved by choosing the longest chain
calculated by the peers 7.
3.5.1 Proof of Work
Bitcoin employs Proof of Work (PoW) [19] as consensus algorithm. This algorithm relies
on nodes competing on hashing power to allocate accounting rights and rewards. Based on
the information of the previous block, the nodes need to calculate a specific solution for a
complex mathematical problem. The first node to solve this problem is granted the ability to
create the next block, and will be reward with a certain amount of currency.
PoW uses workload as safeguard. All nodes trust the longest chain and the length of the
chain is proportional to the amount of workload. For one to control the blockchain they need
to control more than 50% of the hashing power and ensure that they can create the latest
block.
3.5.2 Proof of Stake
Proof of Stake (PoS) [21] is the most common alternative to PoW. PoS depends on
participation, it assumes that the more participation a node has in the network the less
interest it has to commit fraud, as this is will only harm their interests. There are several
measures to determine participations, such as amount of currency, age of currency, and others.
PoS tries to solve PoW problem of wasted resources. The security of the blockchain is
proportional to the value the miners have invested in the network. To devise an attack, the
7Image source: https://coinsutra.com/bitcoin-double-spending
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attacker would have to accumulate a large number of coins and hold them long enough to
make the attack.
Delegated Proof of Stake
Contrary to PoW and PoS, in Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [22], the miners work
together to make blocks instead of competing. In DPoS, coin holders do not vote on the
validity of the blocks, instead they elect witnesses or delegates to make this validation.
3.5.3 Proof of Authority
Proof of Authority (PoA) [23] ensures validation of transactions resorting to approved
accounts. These accounts are the authority from who other nodes receive their truth from.
Although PoA has a high output, it deposits the decision process on a single node, this creates
a central point of failure, and it can even be said that this approximates the network to a
centralized one. This type of consensus is ideal for a private network.
3.5.4 Byzantine Fault Tolerance
The Byzantine Generals problem explains a classic problem in distributed computation.
The problem refers that several generals and their armies have laid siege to a city. The decision
to invade must be unanimous. If some generals give the order to attack without the others the
battle will be lost. This means that the generals will have to use messengers to communicate
with one another in order to better plan their moves [24].
Figure 3.5: The Byzantine Generals Problem8.
Several blockchains adopt algorithms that employ some versions of Byzantine Fault Tol-
erance (BFT).
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)[25] relies on the sheer number of nodes in-
stead of hashing power in order to confirm transaction and generate trust.
8Image source: https://cryptographics.info/cryptographics/blockchain/consensus-mechanisms/delegated-
byzantine-fault-tolerance-dbft/
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In PBFT every node as a public key published. Every message passing through a node
must be signed by the node to verify its format. Once enough identical responses are reached,
then you can agree that the transaction is valid.
Federated Byzantine Fault Tolerance
The Federated Byzantine Fault Tolerance (FBFT) consensus mechanism are generally
associated with Stellar [26] and Ripple Blockchains.
In this type of consensus the nodes do not have to be known and verified ahead of time.
Membership is open, and control is decentralized. Nodes choose their pool of trustees.
Consensus is reached when a system wide quorum emerge from individual nodes, but a
part, or slice, of this quorum can be enough to convince an individual node and sway is vote.
Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance
In Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance (DBFT) consensus occurs through gamification
of block verification among professional nodes. These professional nodes are the ones partici-
pating in the network that are trying to make a profit. The professional nodes participating
in the consensus are nominated by all other nodes. After a professional node propagates their
version of the network, other 66% of the nodes need agree on it in order to achieve consensus.
If this criteria are not met another node must be nominated to broadcast their version until
consensus is met9.
3.6 Smart Contracts
The term smart contract was first conceived by Nick Szabo [27] as “a computerized trans-
action protocol that executes the terms of a contract”. In other words contractual clauses
should be translated into code and embedded into software or hardware, the goal was to min-
imize the need for trusted intermediaries between the interested parties, and the occurrence
of malice and undesired exceptions.
The recent surge of DLT brought the concept back to life, and its coined as one of the main
features on the Ethereum network. In this context, a smart contract is a script stored within
the ledger. As they are stored in the chain they possess an address, ordering a transaction to
this address will trigger its execution on every node of the network.
A smart contract functions as an autonomous actor, whose behaviour is predictable and
deterministic, meaning that given the same input it will always produce the same output. A
smart contract can be seen as having its own “account” on the blockchain, he can also muster
assets and manage them as its code mandates. It will also sign every operation that it does,
leaving a trace that can be verified by the other participants. Its code is also verifiable given
that it resides in the network, which makes it public.
Developers can also create smart contracts that provide features to other smart contracts,
similar to how software libraries work. Or smart contracts could simply be used as a way to
store information.
9https://cryptographics.info/cryptographics/blockchain/consensus-mechanisms/delegated-byzantine-fault-
tolerance-dbft/
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The properties of a smart contract means that it can be trusted to execute any on-chain
logic, as long as this logic can be expressed as functions of data inputs, and as long as the
smart contract is able to reach the data that it was intended to manage.
Figure 3.6: Smart Contract managing resources. A smart contract can represent a physical
asset (e.g. stocks), this smart contract offers an investor the possibility to buy a stake of the
asset11.
3.7 Types of Blockchain
A blockchain can be categorized by the openness of the network: Public, private and
permissioned12.
Public Private Permissioned
Topology Decentralized Partially decentral-
ized
Partially decentral-
ized
R/W access Anyone can read and
anyone can write
Read and Write
permissions are
controlled by single
authority, i.e., the
owner
Read and Write
permissions are
controlled by a pre-
determined set of
nodes
Advantages Secure, as the entire
network verifies the
transactions; Trans-
parent as all transac-
tions are made public
Efficient, as verifica-
tion is made by only
one node; Control of
Read and Write per-
missions
Efficient, as there
is a small number
of nodes participat-
ing in the verifica-
tion; Control of Read
and Write permis-
sions; No consoli-
dation of controlling
power
Disadvantages Inefficient Control resides in
only one organiza-
tion; May need some
sort of node authen-
tication
Needs some sort of
node authentication
Table 3.1: Summary of blockchain technologies categorization
11Image source: https://docs.web3j.io/smart_contracts
12https://blockchainhub.net/blockchains-and-distributed-ledger-technologies-in-general/
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Generally, efficiency and performance grow inverse to the decentralization and openness of
the network. The reason behind this is bigger amount of resources and time needed to reach
consensus.
3.7.1 Public Blockchain
A public blockchain is the classification given to a ledger where anyone can read or send
transactions freely.
In a public blockchain every node shares equal right to read and write data in the ledger.
Anyone can participate in the blockchain and in its consensus algorithm. The absence of an
central entity dictating rules means that this type of network can be totally decentralized.
A public blockchain fits a use case where total transparency is specially needed and trustless
to third parties. Bitcoin is a good example of this type of implementations as it was also the
pioneer of it.
3.7.2 Private Blockchain
A private blockchain implies a fully centralized structure. Having the ability to restrict
permissions to access data increases the privacy of the participants in the network when
compared to a public solution. However the central entity who controls the network has full
privileges and power to make decisions and change rules as it pleases.
This type of implementation suits a scenario where public readability is expendable.
3.7.3 Permissioned Blockchain
Permissioned blockchains, also called consortium or federated blockchains, represent a
compromise between the two previously solutions. It maintains a certain level of decentral-
ization while offering the possibility to control read and write rights. This rights depend on
the identity of the participant and the role it plays as stakeholder. This type of networks usu-
ally depend on smart contracts to enforce the logic and identity validation before executing
transactions.
Hyperledger is an example of implementation of a permissioned blockchain. It is a open-
source distributed ledger designed to record and share data as well as maintaining privacy and
security.
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Chapter 4
State of the art
The need to answer to the question “Who are you?” about an entity behind a device
connected to a network it is not a new problem. In the seventies a public directory was
envisioned by the inventor of public-key cryptography, and a decade after, a grand scheme of
hierarchical certification was envisioned. But the solution that stands is the one designated
by a “patchwork of identity one-offs” [28], comprising several identity management systems
that are restricted to specific domains without interaction between them.
With the rising of DLT, from which blockchains stand out, the opportunity to develop
technological infrastructures, capable of providing the individual ownership and control over
their personal data, grew accordingly. Having this possibility, for the first time in history, we
witness arise of many proposals towards self-sovereignty identity.
In this chapter we are going to take a look and outline what as been already achieved
in the path of self-sovereignty identity, particularly when it includes validations of personal
attributes.
4.1 Sovrin
Sovrin [29] uses an open-source DLT, Hyperledger Indy, to provide an identity network.
In Sovrin only trusted institutions can run nodes that participate in the consensus protocol
(stewards). Making this particularly DLT into a permissioned one.
The governance of the network rest on the Sovrin Foundation and their a legal agreement
called the Sovrin Trust Framework.
A user can use Sovrin to manage any kind of attribute, certified or not.
Within Sovrin a user can generate as many identifiers as they wish, to keep a separation of
identities in order to protect their privacy, these identifiers are unlinkable and controlled with
different asymmetric keys. This project uses the Decentralised Identifier (DID) specification
structures containing the user identifier, a cryptographic public key and other relevant meta-
data1.
Sovrin ledger acts a root-of-trust, and, as new organizations join the network they also
can become trust anchors (i.e., add new organization and new users).
A mobile application and control software agents provide interaction with Sovrin. These
agents allow the user to connect with Service Provider (SP) agents. These agents are endpoints
that are always addressable and accessible. They may run in server owned by the users, but
1https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-spec/
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the most likely scenario are that specialized intermediaries will be used. This intermediaries,
or agencies, alike e-mail systems, will run the agent for the user. Agents also provide backup
service and encrypted storage of credentials.
This application also manages the cryptographic keys stored in the mobile device of the
user. In case of theft or loss a key recovery mechanism is offered. This relies on a set of
trustees. In the event of a recovery request, a quorum of trustees must sign a new identity
record transaction that will then be verified by the stewards.
Figure 4.1: At the base of Sovrin is a permissioned ledger. Only stewards that legally abide by
the Sovrin Trust Framework can write to the ledger. Users and organisations rely on agents
that are addressable network points. Identifiers, keys and endpoint address are stored in the
ledger.
4.2 uPort
uPort [30] aims to provide a decentralized identity framework. Its use case is linked to iden-
tity management in Ethereum Decentralised Application (Dapp)s and traditional centralised
applications.
A uPort identity is supported by the relations that Ethereum smart contracts can establish
with one another. uPort has two templates of smart contract: controller and proxy. When
creating a new identity the user will generate a new key pair on their mobile device through
the uPort mobile application. Then it will send a transaction which instantiates a controller
containing the reference to the public key. After this, a new proxy with the controller reference
is created, only the controller can call functions from the proxy. A user is free to create multiple
uPortIDs that are unlinkable.
The user private key is stored on their mobile device. This leads to an important aspect
of uPort. Like Sovrin, there is the possibility to recover a from a lost key. The user must
nominate trustees that can vote to replace the public key of the user. When consensus is
achieved between the trustees the controllers replace the lost key with the proposed public
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key. This allows the user to maintain a persistent uPortID even after a loss of keys.
uPort also maps identity attributes to a particular uPortID. This is done by the registry,
a global mapping of IDs to attributes. Any entity can query a registry but only the owner can
modify it. Given that it is inefficiency to store large volumes of data on the ledger, only the
hash of the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) attribute structure, is stored, the data itself
is stored on the Interplanetary File System (IPFS), a distributed file system where a file is
mapped by its cryptographic hash.
Figure 4.2: On uPort a user identity is comprised of a mobile application and two smart
contracts: controller and proxy. The registry is a smart contract that provides a decentralised
mapping of uPort identifiers to identity attributes. The registry can be globally read, and can
reference data stored in an off-DLT data store such as the IPFS.
4.3 Blockcerts
Blockcerts2 is a initiative from the Media Lab of the MIT and Learning Machine. The
goal of the project is to issue and validate official records such as academic achievements.
It uses version 2 of the Open Badge standard for its certificates expanding the former with
distributed ledger technologies.
In Blockcerts, a certificate issuer signs a well-structured digital certificate and stores its
hash within a blockchain transaction. The output is then assigned to the recipient of the
certificate. Besides this linkage to the public key of the owner of the certificate, this one will
also contain the email of the owner to enforce the linkage of identity. When presented to a
third party, this party can attest if the certificate actually belongs to that user through a
verification email and/or with a challenge-response which the user can use to prove that he
possesses the private key that pairs with the known public key.
The key pair should have been previously generated by the user and stored in a mobile
application built for the propose of storing this key material and the collection of certificates.
2https://www.blockcerts.org
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Blockcerts addition to verify the validity of a certificate resides in the blockchain and the
hash calculated at the moment of issue. The integrity is checked by looking at the blockchain
and see if the hash is indeed there and if it corresponds to the original
In the first version of the Blockcerts a small amount of cryptocurrency would be assigned
both to the issuer and the owner. If this amount where to be spent the verifier should consider
that the certificate as been revoked. In later versions a unique revocation list could be assigned
to each certificate.
The usage of this revocation list, as well the standard libraries to verify the validity of
the certificates, allows the issuer to know how often a certificate is shared and possibly with
whom is shared.
Figure 4.3: The Blockcerts architecture has two phases, issuing, on the left side, and distri-
bution, on the right side. The issuance depended on an address given by the receiver. The
certificate is created, signed, hashed to the blockchain and a copy given to the receiver. The
receiver will then distribute this copy and the service provider will verify its hash on the
address that corresponds to the certificate.
4.4 ShoCard
ShoCard [31, 32] provides a trusted identity that recurs to DLT to bind a user ID to an
existing trusted credential (e.g., personal identification document), with additional personal
attributes. This is made through cryptographic hash stored in Bitcoin transactions.
ShoCard uses a central server as a core element of its architecture, this server intermediates
the exchange of encrypted identity information between the user and relying parties. This
architecture is dived in three parts: bootstrapping, certification and validation.
Bootstrapping occurs when a new ShoCard is created. The mobile app generates cryp-
tographic material for the user and scans their personal identification document through the
mobile device camera. The image obtained and respective data are then encrypted and stored
in the device, the signed hash of this data is then embedded into a Bitcoin transaction for
later validation purposes. This transaction will be known as the user ShoCardID and is stored
in the app as a pointer do the ShoCard seal.
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The interaction with IdPs to gather attributes is made in the certification processes. During
this process the IdPs must ensure that the user knows the data hashed and the keys that signed
the seal. Face-to-face validation can be achieved by the user providing the original data used
to produce the seal, a digitally signed challenge and the original trusted credential. The
certificate takes the form of a signed hash of new attributes in a Bitcoin transaction created
by the provider. This transaction must be shared with the user along with a plain text signed
version of the attributes. This will be later needed to provide attributes to relying parties,
and serve as recovery in case the mobile device is lost. The encrypted version of certifications
can be stored in a ShoCard server, this server never learns the encryption key, enabling the
user to share certifications with selected parties only.
The last phase, the validation phase, occurs when a relying party does a verification to
determine whether a user is entitled to access a service. To validate the encrypted certification
the user provides the relying party with a reference and a key to it. The relying party then
proceeds to do all necessary verifications: the key that signed the encrypted certification is the
same that signed the seal; the certification signature is from a trusted entity and the plain text
certification corresponds to the one hashed in the certification; and that the identity presented
by the user in the transaction match those signed and hashed in the seal.
Figure 4.4: ShoCard uses Bitcoin to record personal data that was verified during identity
proofing, and for storage of hashes of certifications that build upon the Seal of the user created
by relying parties. The ShoCard server plays an active role as an intermediary between users
and relying parties.
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Chapter 5
Solution architecture
An entity that publishes attributes about a subject must have some level of trust. One can
say that the value of that attribute will be as high as the trust in the Attribute Provider (AP)
that published it. Frequently the trust deposited in an AP will not be flat, but hierarchical,
i.e. behind an AP should be an entity that the other peers hold in higher regard. To address
this, we intent to explore entities that are responsible for regulating certain sectors of business
that usually are more trusted by the general public.
In this section we describe a system that aims to provide trust on personal attributes while
trying to facilitate its management and disclosure by the owners.
5.1 Roles
Four types of roles were defined:
1. User: this role is to be taken by entities interested in having their attributes certified;
2. Attribute Provider (AP): this role is to be taken by entities entitled to certify
attributes belonging to a given subject (e.g., a university);
3. Service Provider (SP): this role is to be taken by entities interested in consume
attributes claimed by users and, for that reason, must verify its trustworthiness;
4. Regulatory Body (RB): this role is to be taken by entities in charge of regulating or
supervising activities in a particular business sector (e.g., ANACOM, the authority that
regulates telecommunications and postal services in Portugal, etc.).
The RBs must also be a member of the consortium responsible manage the system. This
should guarantee that the administrator will not be seen as a “higher than everything” entity.
5.2 Attributes
A certified attribute is a set of attributes with two or three extra attributes: an ID of the
issuer (public key), the ID of the owner (public key), a digital signature made by the issuer
and the personal attribute.
A personal attribute is a tagged value; the tag describes its semantics, e.g., birthday date,
weight, address, etc.
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Figure 5.1: Example of a set of attribute as a tagged value
An attribute seldom is used alone but rather grouped with other attributes. This happens
because hardly a single attribute describes all the characteristics of an entity required in some
context. Typically, at least two attributes are needed: one with an identifier (that identifies the
entity to which the attributes refer) and the other containing the entity relevant characteristic
for the given context. Figure 5.1 illustrates a set of attributes. Other examples of grouping of
attributes are the user attributes in a driver license or in a national Id card (e.g., Portuguese
Citizen Card).
Attributes can have a lifetime or not, this depends on the AP that issues them. Attributes
can also have a infinite or finite number of disclosures, it also depends on the issuer. We could
consider a document that needs to be renewed from time to time (e.g., a student identification
card, which is renewed annually) as prime example of an attribute with lifetime, typically
these certifications only have a validity of three years and need to be renewed after that time.
As an attribute is to be linked to an unique address, any and every update on this attribute
will be readily available to anyone who as been give access to it. This means that if a user
is to reveal their home address to an employer and other services, if they move to a different
house they would change the attribute that corresponds to their new home address and the
change would be propagated.
5.3 Interactions Overview
The interactions between the roles described must be governed by a basic set of poli-
cies. These policies describe the requirements that entities must fulfill in order to be able to
participate in the network and how this participation is made.
5.3.1 Attribute certification
The client that approaches an AP to request the publishing of an attribute assumes the
role of User. It is the responsibility of the AP to employ a process of authentication of the
user at the moment of the request before making any certification. After this they should
agree on the format of the attribute, and the user should provide details relative to the wallet
address with which the attribute will be associated.
5.3.2 Exploitation of certified attributes
The wallet where the attribute is stored contains a set of secret credentials (i.e., a pair
of private-public keys), that allows the user to assert the ownership of the attribute. Thus,
when a User interacts with a SP, to assert possession of an attribute the user must provide a
reference to said attribute and use the keys to sign it to prove ownership.
28
The AP must not be able to monitor the usage of the attribute, meaning that he can not
limit or know to whom the attribute is presented.
At any time an attribute can be revoked by the AP, this operation does not eliminate the
certificated attribute from the ledger, it only translates into a impossibility to use it as a valid
attribute after that date. A revoked attribute can still be shared with a SP to state that we
owned such attribute in the past.
Figure 5.2: Flow of actions. The normal flow can be disrupted by a rogue attribute that
would trigger a repudiation and consequently an audit. Not illustrated in the diagram are the
operations of attribute revocation made by the AP.
5.3.3 Privacy
Each certificate is bound to a unique User pseudonym, the set of pseudonyms is managed
by a user wallet. With this it is impossible to know which is the real identity of the owner of
an attribute or set of attributes. Furthermore, attributes can either be obfuscated or in clear
value.
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5.4 Trust Management
The society, in general, trusts on RBs to do a proper supervision of their business sec-
tor and to keep a coherent blockchain among themselves. Within RBs, they only trust on
authenticated RB peers to enter on blockchain definition update agreements.
Figure 5.3: In the proposed trust model, every new RB needs to be approved by pre-existing
RBs in the ledger. New APs are approved by their respective RB
Each RB maintains a list of federated AP and trusts that APs perform a correct certifica-
tion. Abusive certifications cannot be immediately detected by RB but can be later identified
by auditing transaction or by attribute repudiation by the User.
To use the attribute the SP only needs to trust the AP that issued the attribute and
verified that the User is indeed the owner. This can be seen as a similarity to a PKI. However
this similarity is limited to the hierarchy, as the objectives of each are different.
In a PKI, the goal is to offer trust in certified attributes (a certificate is nothing more than
a set of certified attributes, and in that sense a CA may be seen as an AP), i.e., it guarantees
that an entity that certifies attributes is who it say it is. With this in mind, a PKI should
be employed so that the consumer of attributes knows who was the entity who certified such
attribute.
This hierarchy aims to ensure that the APs that participate in the ledger are legitimate,
and that they can issue certified attributes of some sort. It should be noticed that there may
be some APs of more than one type. In essence, this hierarchy guarantees than the AP that
issues certificates is entitled to do so, but it does not mean that it is authenticated.
5.5 User Wallet
A user wallet is fundamental to manage a set of attributes. It assures the secrecy of the
credentials used by its owner, both when requesting and disclosing certified attributes.
The wallet is the main point of interaction between the user and the network and must
be able to shield the user from technical details. This details may include, but not be limited
to, deterministic hierarchical key management. The introduction of this standard would allow
the user to have multiple attributes, each within a different address, while only needing to
manage one master key.
The management of keys could also be simplified with the introduction of BIP-00391,
this standard introduces a pass-phrase or mnemonic sentence to generate and manage key
1https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki
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pairs, this type of element is more user friendly than handling raw binary or hexadecimal
representations of a wallet seed.
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Chapter 6
Implementation
6.1 Choice of Blockchain
As mentioned before, and summarised in table 3.1, there are three categories of blockchain.
Figure 6.1 shows a flow chart intended to help choosing between a traditional database,
a permissioned blockchain or public blockchain. The questions presented help make the right
decision based on the requirements defined.
Figure 6.1: Graph to answer: Do you need a blockchain? [33]
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Confronting this chart with our requirements we are able to justify the choice of a permis-
sioned blockchain because of the following:
• The traditional database cannot meet the needs of self-sovereign identity;
• More than one entity need to be able to update the data;
• There is no trust between all participants;
• There is no third party with full trust;
• The data must be kept private;
• There is the need to control read and write access to data.
The necessity to employ a permissioned ledger is highlighted by the answers given to the
questions presented by 6.1. There are three implementations of permissioned blockchains:
Hyperleder1 Fabric; Corda2; Multichain3.
Comparing this three alternatives, Hyperledger is the strongest option based on the fol-
lowing:
• Modularity: The modularity of Hyperledger enables organizations to plug their pre-
ferred encryption, consensus and other components that may integrate well with existing
systems.
• Transaction Speed: Transaction confirmation is rated at 100 000 transactions per
second.
• Safety: Identity management and strong authentication provided by PKCS11.
• Smart Contracts: Permits more comprehensive capabilities.
6.2 Hyperledger Fabric and Hyperledger Composer
In this thesis, Hyperledger Fabric4 and Hyperledger Composer5 are used as blockchain
framework and developer tools, with more focus on the later. Meaning that we can abstract
from more advanced and tweakable features of Hyperledger Fabric that escape the scope of
the project.
However, the necessity to understand the big picture that fabric provides is of great im-
portance.
1https://hyperledger.github.io/
2https://www.corda.net/
3https://www.multichain.com/
4https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric
5https://github.com/hyperledger/composer
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6.2.1 Architecture Overview
The architecture of a system built on top of Fabric and Composer is distributed in three
layers: Application, Developer Tools and Blockchain Runtime.
Communication between the application layer and tool layer is made through a REST
API, this API is provided by a rest server embed in the tools layer. The connection between
the other layers, tools and runtime, are made with secure connection profiles. This profiles
contain TCP/IP address and ports for the peers and certificates. Figure 6.2 tries to summarise
interactions.
Figure 6.2: Hyperledger architecture
The application layer may include web applications, existing systems, or in some use cases
Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
In the developer tools layer, Hyperledger composer provide a vast toolset to enable rapid
development and testing of business logic intended to run on top of a blockchain. It offers
some high-level components: Command Line Interface (CLI), Rest server for integration with
applications, a Web UI, and a SDK. The Web UI is a playground that allows the developer
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to rapidly engage with the network and test the network definition. The later is a API built
on top of Node.JS that allow us to perform operations on blockchain resources.
In the Blockchain Runtime component, we have Hyperledger Fabric, the distributed ledger.
In this layer we have: Membership, Blockchain and Chaincode (i.e., smart contracts) services.
6.2.2 Consensus Flow
In hyperledger the consensus protocol can be adapted to the necessities of the network,
however it provides a default consensus through Kafka Ordering Service. The ledger reaches
consensus by performing two activities: Ordering and Validating Transactions.
Figure 6.3: Hyperledger Consensus Flow6.
The client submits transactions to a pending pool of consensus. The order will then select a
specific number of transactions and order them based on the consensus algorithm, this can be,
as mention, adapted. The contents of transactions are encrypted so that the orderer remains
agnostic to the transactions.
The next step is validation by the chaincode, the goal is to check if the transactions are in
compliance with the logic defined before. If the transaction is verified with success it will be
broadcasted with proof of correctness. In the end the changes are committed to other peers
in the ledger.
6.3 Modeling of network
In Hyperledger Composer there are four main types of resources: Assets, Participants,
Transactions, and Events. These are succinctly explained in table 6.1.
6Image source: https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/arch-deep-dive.html
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Definition Example
Asset Tangible or intangible goods, ser-
vices or property.
Houses and listings.
Participant Actor with a certain role. Buyers, owners and realtors.
Transaction Interactions between participants
and assets
Buying, selling, and creating and
closing listings.
Event Message emitted by transaction. "Alice bought a house from Bob"
Table 6.1: Summary definition and examples of resources on Hyperledger
Other types of classes such as enumerates, types and concepts are also defined within the
model of the network, so they all fall in the same category and can also be consider resources.
The specifics of assets, participants and transactions, and how this translates for this
solution are detailed below.
6.3.1 Assets
Assets can range from tangible to intangible things, i.e it can be something that has a
physical representation or something without a physical form. In our solution there is an
intangible asset, the attribute.
The attribute must, inevitably, be linked to the owner and the issuer. The linkage to the
owner is very important, as in self-sovereignty we need to guarantee that the owner is who
ultimately controls the aspects about them. At request from the user they will have the power
to update the attribute, and, in case of need, they can revoke it.
The act of revoking an attribute must be justified it can not be a simple binary property.
The status of revocation will have to comprise both the binary status (i.e., valid or not valid)
and a field with details about it.
In certain situations it also may be of use having other entities capable of revoking a
certain attribute. Be it in the case of also having some responsibility about the emission of
that attribute or in the case of a rogue AP that is being closed down by the respective RB.
This can be summarized as saying that the essential properties to define this asset are: an
ID imposed by the modelling language, a field containing the actual attribute (i.e. a blob),
an owner, an issuer, information regarding the attribute validity or revocation status, and a
list of optional revokers. Besides this essential properties, the attribute will also have a field
stating the type of business that issued it.
The owner will have the power to reveal their attributes to other participants in the
network, having this ability means that the owner must always be aware of which entities
are capable of reading it. This can be done by adding a field with list of authorized users.
Unfortunately, in the current state of the Hyperledger Composer, the access control of asset
properties is not supported. Adopting this approach would allow entities with access to the
attribute to know all others that also have access, raising a linkability problem.
6.3.2 Participants
The participants are the actors with specific roles in the network. Previously we identified
four distinct roles: RBs, APs, Users and SP.
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All of them have the need to have an ID and digital certificate containing their well known
public key. To this generic type of participant we are going to call it “Member”, and upon it
the other participants will be built.
For the RB we will add a field with the name of the institution (e.g., FCC) and the business
sector they are responsible for. The AP is very similar, but instead of being responsible for a
sector they belong to it.
The SP will have only one addition, a name, the goal of this field is to allow the user to
better understand who are the entities that he is going to give permissions. In the definition
of the SP it is also included a list of attributes to which they where granted access. This will
prevent the linkability problem referred in the attribute description.
The User is the only participant with no extra fields compared with the Member.
Figure 6.4: Participants properties
6.3.3 Transactions
Transactions are a mechanism of interaction between participants and other resources. A
Participant can submit a transaction in order to create, delete or change one or more properties
of assets. Transaction are particularly useful when there is the need to limit or complement
default actions.
There are three interactions core to our proposal that cannot be translated to pre-existing
transactions:
1. Revoke/Repudiate attribute: Even though a revoke operation can only be triggered
by a AP and a repudiate operation can only be triggered by the owner of the attribute,
the logic behind them is the same. A entity with permissions (i.e., a revoker) will submit
this transaction where three mandatory fields need to be filled, attribute ID, revocation
status and revocation details. If correct this details will correspond to a valid transaction
and from that point on that attribute cannot be used again. This does not mean that
it is deleted, it will remain in the user wallet, and can serve as proof of past validity.
2. Grant Access: When Users wants to allow a SP to read and validate one of their
attributes, they will need to submit a grant access transaction from their wallet. Ap-
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plication can provide a certain level of abstraction from this operation and offer a more
user friendly approach, but this transaction receives an attribute ID and a SP ID. When
successful, this transaction will append the attribute reference to the aforementioned SP
authorized read list.
3. Revoke Access: Working very similarly to the previously described interaction, this
transaction instead of appending the attribute reference will remove it.
Figure 6.5 illustrate a transaction processor function, more specifically the one correspond-
ing to grant access operation.
Figure 6.5: Example of a transaction processor function
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6.4 Access Control
Access Control Language (ACL) allow us to define access control rules of interaction be-
tween asset, participant and transactions. With it we can restrict which participant types are
permitted to operate resources in the network.
Is important to refer that there are two types of access control: business access control
and network control. They control the access to the resources within the network and the
administrative changes, respectively.
Rules can be simple or conditional. Simple rules are used to control access to an asset,
or property, of an asset by a participant. On the other hand conditional rules employ a
Boolean JavaScript expression in order to evaluate the application. In the later we can indicate
a transaction, and this will allow the participant to access the resource only through that
transaction.
Figure 6.6: Example of Access Control Rules
The figure above shows an example of network access control. This case shows us how a
transaction can limit the access to resources. In a normal scenario it is inconceivable that a
participant can alter properties of other participants, but in this case, through the transaction,
the user can append the authorization in the SP.
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6.5 Integration Interface
The business network can be integrated with exiting systems or other applications using a
Loopback7 API. This provides a feasible way to have systems sending data to the blockchain.
Hyperledger Composer exposes a REST API that serves the purpose of a gateway, subscrib-
ing events triggered by transactions. The server and client communicate through a WebSocket.
The REST server can be secured with HTTPS and TLS, allowing encryption of all data
between client and server.
The transaction processor can also call external REST services in order to move complex
computation off the blockchain.
Figure 6.7: Integration with other services
This offers the possibility to securely integrate the network with external services with
different protocols. Thus a simple web app was devised to test said integration capabilities
and other aspects of the system.
6.6 Testing and Demo
6.6.1 Testing
In order to test iterations of the network definition we employed a bash scrip. This script
purges the network, creates the archive, installs the definition on the containers, authenticates
the administrator and launches the network.
After initializing the containers and bring the network on-line, we were able to explore
the REST API and use another script as genesis of the network, creating resources so that
particularly interactions could be tested with the assurance that the resources were well defined
and compliant.
The composer playground offers a easy to use interface to test the intended features of a
network definition.
7https://loopback.io/
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Figure 6.8: Composer playground: entities used in testing
Figure 6.8 shows us a list of all the entities used during tests. Composer also allowed us
to keep all the entities in the same wallet so we could swap between one another.
Figure 6.9: Composer playground: Attribute Provider view
Figure 6.9 represents the view of the asset registry while logged as the AP with the ID
0002. As intended the AP has read permissions over the attributes issued by them. The same
registry would contain different results depending on the entity that was logged.
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Figure 6.10: Composer playground: Asset Creation
Figure 6.10 contains the form for asset creation. Asset creation, as well as participant
creation, are pre-existing transactions. Being pre-existing transactions they have dedicated
buttons to activate them. Once again this allows us to test several conditions intended to be
controlled by the access control module. In this case the ledger would verify that the issuer
number in the JSON is the same of the entity logged in, as well as the business sector.
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Figure 6.11: User App Grant Access action
Figure 6.11 is an example of a failed transaction. For testing purposes we have an AP
submitting a grant access transaction for an asset that belongs to one of their clients. Given
that he does not own said asset, the transaction naturally fails, the lack of read permissions
over the object triggers an error when the nodes try to execute the chain code during the
endorsing process.
The results of testing will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.
6.6.2 Demo
A simple demo was made to complement the testing capabilities offered by the Hyperledger
Composer playground. The later serves its propose to test a prototype network but does not
allow us to abstract from some details, such as fields that are automatically defined. It was
also built with the intent to test the integration through the REST API.
Instead of a raw JSON, the demo has a friendlier approach to transactions. In it, the user
is prompted with a form where some fields are already filled, needing only to indicate the
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SP ID to execute a grant access transaction, the behaviour will be exactly the same in the
opposite operation.
Figure 6.12: [Composer playground: Failed transaction
The Demo also allow us to get a different view on some interactions. The most notorious
example of this is when a SP as granted access. Without the app we would have to check the
SP listings as a user to find the SP with access to our attributes.
Using the composer playground, we would add entities with the various roles to our wallet
and alternate between them to test read and write accesses.
Figure 6.13: User App listing SPs with access to an attribute
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Chapter 7
Result Analysis
As stated in chapter 1, the goal of this dissertation is to devise a decentralized network
capable of supporting validation of personal attributes and enforcing the principals that define
a self-sovereign identity as well as data-security, issuer validation, unlikability, revocation and
usability.
Being employed on a permissioned ledger means that the network can force a certain level
of regulation through code, if done correctly, this code will always operate as intended and
maintain policies across the network no matter what. In Hyperledger case, this is in great
part done by the access control rules as described in section 6.4.
After some analysis on all interfaces made available to interact with the network, the REST
API, the Composer Playground, and the simple user demo, we can make some judgement on
how said rules enforce our goals. In a situation where a participant does not have permission
to READ a object the system will respond with an error claiming that the object does not
exist. This is interesting in a sense that an evil doer cannot test the existence of random
attribute IDs. Rules promote data security, user access and control over their attribute.
Figure 7.1: Error upon trying to access an attribute that does not belong to the current user.
There is of course the need to authenticate participants through the Membership Service
Provider (MSP), so the rules can know who the participant is supposed to be and which assets
can he access, and how. This represents a contradiction to the principle of existence in self-
sovereign identity, given that the user cannot be independent from the system, but instead is
part of it. Even though it can be abstracted by saving the credentials next to the participant
app, figure 7.2 shows the files that include details on how to access the network (i.e., address
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and ports) and the cryptographic keys to authenticate the user.
Figure 7.2: Card files to authenticate participants
Using a decentralized system with centralized control means that a few principles of self-
sovereign identity can only be achieved through a responsible consortium, this entity that is
mapped into the administrator role must allow the other participants access to the definition
of the network in order to cultivate transparency as stated in 2.1.2. We found that the use of
a persistent ledger contradicts the right to be forgotten, even though the attributes cease to
exist in the current state, they will forever be in the transaction history, even though only the
consortium can access and audit it, this represent not only a shortcoming from our solution
but also a shortcoming in the usage of blockchain technologies in self-sovereign identity.
Unlikability in a technology with the natural ability to keep a registry of all operation
that occur represents a challenge, as stated in 6.3.1, poor planning can lead to the possibility
of linking attributes to IDs and to providers. Even though the blob of the attribute may be
obfuscated, and all the users hide behind an alias, one could infer many information by looking
at the issuer of an attribute and to the services that are consulting it. Limiting the READ
permissions on the transaction history is imperative, as well as storing access permissions
separated from the attribute.
The major shortcoming in the current state is minimization, there is no possibility to reveal
only certain properties of attributes or some form of simplification on this attributes, such as
an assertion of being older than a certain age. Future work would need to be employed to
achieve.
The enforcement of issuer validation is different, meaning that the transaction enforces the
type of business of the attribute so that it is the same of the issuer at the moment of creation
of the asset.
Usability is important as the user should be shielded from technical details, for the users
it is not relevant if they are using a private key to sign a challenge in order to authenticate
them, only that they need to use PIN to authenticate. This is also true in the demo built,
there we can see two different approach to other entities evolved in the attribute. In one case,
the issuer, we have a reference for is ID in the network, and in the other, we have the name
of the service provider. This serves to compare which is more friendly, even though it could
be obvious, it is important to support these conclusions with experimentation.
48
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This dissertation aimed to build a decentralized solution for personal attribute manage-
ment that would follow the paradigm of self-sovereign identity. This was made using Hyper-
ledger Fabric and Hyperledger Composer, as our research revealed that we had to employ a
permissioned ledger and this was the one that better suited the needs raised by our goals.
Following an analysis of existing similar solutions, to bring self-sovereignty to reality, we
concluded that true decentralization seems difficult and those solutions tend to leverage several
decentralization techniques but end up reshaping the role of central entities. This unwanted
centralization originates in the need to use central authorities as trust providers. During this
research it was clear that this is an aspect that cannot be escaped because in context of identity
we need to ensure trust. While DLT were designed to eliminate central points of control, this
is not a realistic goal in scenarios that need to resort to IdM given the profound need for a
source of trust.
Our solution shares the same flaws while dealing with attributes. We differ from the other
proposals in the sense that the user does not make claims and then asks for their verification,
instead it is an AP that directly creates and attests the claim. There is also an attempt
to increase the trust by having RBs being responsible for approving issuers, and monitoring
their actions, increasing the regulatory properties of the ledger. In the end, the user will still
maintain the need to login into the new service provided by the network that we devised,
creating one more credential to manage.
It is also important to refer that the tightening of regulations, of which GDPR is an
example, gives end-users new powers over their data, and data controllers other responsibilities.
This regulations also provide more transparency to the processes, and protection to the user
rights. Unfortunately, decentralized solutions associated with immutable ledger, currently, are
incapable of fulfilling some of the requirements imposed by those regulations (e.g., right to be
forgotten). However, its positive to see legal initiatives protecting the user and adhering to
some of the principles behind self-sovereign identity.
Delaying advances on this field of research may seem unacceptable as decentralization
gains ground as the next best thing. We already see the original cartoon of Peter Steiner
being replaced by the on-line adage “On the blockchain nobody knows you’re a fridge”1.
Working on this project, we have, not only, learned a lot about blockchain, but also about
the way that technology can shape socio-economic practices around the concept of credentials.
Many of the most interesting challenges we encountered were not technical in nature,
1https://gendal.me/2013/10/23/on-the-blockchain-nobody-knows-youre-a-fridge/
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but they cannot easily be separated from the technology because small design decisions can
fundamentally shape behaviour. Blockchain is a maturing technology and its complexity and
immutability make it even more important to consider the long-term effects of architecture
decisions.
8.1 Future Work
The current network definition does not allow minimalization principle of self-sovereignty
as intended, to support it would require the reimplementation of the current solution. Which
means that the network definition as it stands is subject to changes, minimization would,
possibly, require the introduction of new assets. This small aspect of self-sovereign should not
be underestimated, an effective minimalization will protect individuals’ privacy. This aspect
of a self-sovereign identity system must be prioritized in future iterations of this system.
A permissioned blockchain would always be the best option, given that access control rules
have a major role in securing the data on the ledger. Unfortunately it also means that the
user must be, in certain way, enrolled in the system. It would be particularity interesting to
be able to separate the user from the other entities, once again contributing for a solution
closer from what self-sovereign identity means.
Since the scope of this thesis was mostly the definition of a regulated ledger capable of
holding and distribute personal attributes, the definition of formats and obfuscation processes
were not addressed. This must not undermine their importance and in future iterations it
should be considered of high importance. Given that a big part of the logic behind obfuscation
should be made before the attribute reaches the blockchain, applications directed at APs and
SPs should be developed.
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